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1. Introduction 
    Recent observations of prolonged expansionary monetary policies have revived the issue of how 
monetary policies would affect firms, especially their differential effects across different industries and 
firms. An increased liquidity provision would induce banks to soften lending standards (Maddaloni and 
Peydró, 2011) and hence help the liquidity-constrained companies to access the capital market more 
easily than before. This paper investigates if an expansionary monetary policy shock disproportionately 
increases the market value of a distressed firm which has a profit substantially smaller than its interest 
expense and hence is likely to need costly external financing to pay the interest.  
   We begin by estimating the publicly traded US firms’ stock-return sensitivities to monetary policy 
shocks (MPS), labeled MPS beta, by controlling for the four pricing factors used in the investment-based 
factor model (Hou et al., 2014) that is successful in reducing pricing errors. By doing so, we minimize the 
concern that the MPS beta is contaminated by omitted variables related to the stock returns. The sample is 
daily and covers the period 2001-2015. We measure monetary policy shocks as unexpected increases in 
the US Federal funds rate by using the data on the Federal funds rate futures price (Kuttner, 2001; 
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). At the second stage regression, we examine how the firm-level MPS beta is 
related to the firm’s characteristics, especially a distress dummy that indicates whether the firm’s 
profitability is so bad that the firm’s profit would be smaller than the interest expense even if the firm had 
been offered the market-wide lowest interest rate. This distress dummy, related to the “profitability-side” 
index to identify zombie firms in the literature (Fukuda and Nakamura, 2011; Imai, 2016), strongly 
indicates that the firm is likely to need costly external financing to pay its interest expense.  
   We find that for an unexpected reduction in the Federal funds rate, a distressed firm’s stock return 
disproportionately increases, holding constant other firm-level fundamentals (e.g., size, leverage ratio, age, 
and market-to-book ratio). Our findings suggest that an expansionary monetary policy shock can reduce 
the costs associated with external financing and hence increase the firm value, especially for a distressed 
firm in need of costly external financing. 
 
2. Methodology 
   We measure monetary policy shocks as unexpected increases in the US Federal funds rate by using the 
data on the Federal funds rate futures price (Kuttner, 2001; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). Changes in the 
monetary policy occur in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, which are not daily 
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events.
 
As such, we need a daily proxy for the monetary policy shock. As in the asset pricing literature 
(Adrian et al., 2014; Detzel, 2015), we construct a portfolio of publicly traded stocks and investment-
grade corporate bonds such that returns to this portfolio mimic well monetary policy shocks observed 
during the FOMC meeting dates.
1
 (For more detailed procedures, see Online Appendix.) We use this 
portfolio, labeled mimicking portfolio, as a proxy for a monetary policy shock and estimate the firm-level 
stock return sensitivity to the mimicking portfolio’s return, labeled MPS beta.    
   We estimate the firm-level MPS beta by controlling for a number of pricing factors. By doing so, we 
aim that estimates of MPS betas are not contaminated by omitted factors. By contrast, many of previous 
studies do not control for such pricing factors (other than the market factor) in estimating the return 
response to monetary policy shocks. (See, e.g., Cenesizoglu and Essid (2012) and Maio (2014).)  
  More specifically, we use the recently developed investment-based pricing model (Hou et al., 2014) that 
greatly reduces pricing errors: this model can explain a wide range of anomalies found from the CAPM 
and Fama-French three-factor model. This model employs the four pricing factors as follows: (i) the 
market portfolio, (ii) the small minus big (SMB) factor, (iii) the robust minus weak (RMW) factor, and 
(iv) the conservative minus aggressive (CMA) factor. The SMB factor represents the zero-investment 
portfolio that is long in small market value stocks and short in large market value stocks; the RMW factor 
is long in firms with high operating profitability (robust) and short in firms with low operating 
profitability (weak); the CMA factor is long in firms with a low investment rate (conservative) and short 
in firms with a high investment rate (aggressive).  
   Let 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denote stock i’s excess return (above one-month Treasury bill rate) on date t. We write the 
regression equation of 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  as: 
          𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀,𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑅𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝑅𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀𝑃𝑆,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑆,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡         (1) 
where 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 refers to the excess return to the market portfolio, 𝑅𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 the return to SMB factor, 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑡 the 
return to RMW factor, 𝑅𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑡 the return to CMA factor, 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑆,𝑡 the return to the portfolio mimicking the 
monetary policy shocks, and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 the error term. We estimate firm-level stock-return sensitivities to these 
five factors during each of five subsample periods: (i) 2001-2003, (ii) 2004-2006, (iii) 2007-2009, (iv) 
2010-2012, and (v) 2013-2015. Thus, we allow the MPS beta to vary over different periods, especially 
differences in MPS beta between the crisis period of 2007-2009 and the non-crisis period. 
                                                          
1
 The correlation coefficient between monetary policy shocks and mimicking portfolio returns is 0.49, which is 
much higher than the typical correlation coefficient between the infrequently observed pricing factor and its 
mimicking portfolio return in the asset pricing literature, e.g., 0.37 in Adrian et al. (2014) and 0.35 in Detzel (2015). 
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   We proceed to investigating determinants of MPS betas ?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑆,𝑖,𝑠 that are estimated for firm i during 
subsample period s and significant at the five percent level. That is, we run a panel regression of 
significant ?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑆,𝑖,𝑠 on firm characteristics and other controls as: 
  ?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑆,𝑖,𝑠 = 𝛿 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑠 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑠 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑠 + 𝛾4𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑠 + Ω 𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝑖,𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑠       (2) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑠  refers to the distress dummy indicating unprofitability (explained later), 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑠  the 
size (i.e., book value of total assets), 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑠 the leverage ratio (i.e., total debt-to-total assets ratio), 𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑠 
the market-to-book value ratio of equity (proxy for the growth option), and 𝑒𝑖,𝑠 the error term. Ω is the 
vector of coefficients on other control variables: age; tangibility of assets (measured as the property, plant 
and equipment relative to total assets); industry dummies; crisis dummy indicating whether an 
observation belongs to 2007-2009 period; and interaction terms between the financial industry dummy 
and three key fundamentals: size, leverage, and market-to-book ratio, so that we can control for financial 
industry-specific effects, if any, of these three fundamentals on the MPS beta. 
Note that many previous studies compare MPS betas between different portfolios sorted by firm 
characteristics (Maio, 2014). Importantly, many of such firm characteristics (e.g., size, leverage ratio, 
market-to-book ratio, and age) are correlated with each other. Therefore, in the regression of MPS beta, 
we explicitly control for these firm characteristics to isolate the effect of each of these characteristics on 
the MPS beta. 
2.1. Discussion: Definition and external financing need of a distressed firm  
   It is of our main interest to examine the relationship between the firm’s MPS beta and distress. Our 
benchmark measure of distress is a distress dummy 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑠   that indicates whether the firm’s 
profitability is substantially bad such that the firm’s profit is smaller than the interest expense implied by 
the market-wide minimum interest rate as in the literature studying ‘zombie’ firms (Fukuda and 
Nakamura, 2011; Imai, 2016). More specifically, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑠 is set to one if the firm’s before-tax profit 
(measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)) is, on average, 
smaller than the firm’s minimum interest expense that is calculated by multiplying the firm’s outstanding 
short- and long-term debts by the short-term prime loan rate and the AAA-rated long-term corporate bond 
rate, respectively. Thus, our distress dummy strongly indicates that in the near future, the firm will need 
external financing to pay its interest expense. For robustness check, we also consider an alternative 
measure of distress: the interest coverage ratio, measured as the ratio of before-tax profit (EBITDA) to the 
firm’s actual interest expense, which is an inverse measure of distress.   
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3. Theoretical Background 
  We consider two hypotheses about the reason why a distressed firm is more sensitive to monetary policy 
shocks, even after controlling for leverage and future profitability. First, a distressed firm has the smaller 
internal funds (e.g., retained profits) and hence the greater need for external funds (e.g., bank loans and 
bonds) to pay interest expenses than a non-distressed firm does, holding all else constant. Importantly, 
external funds are more costly than internal funds, due to financial market imperfections (Hennessy and 
Whited, 2007). In this case, a drop in the interest rate directly reduces the level of interest expense and 
hence the distressed firm’s need for costly external funds, which would disproportionately increase the 
distressed firm’s equity value. (In Online Appendix, we provide a simple formal model and derive these 
results analytically.) Second, a distressed firm tends to be a target of merger and acquisition, where the 
offer price of the target firm’s equity is usually above its market value due to the possible synergies and 
determined by the bargaining power between the target and acquiring firms. A drop in the interest rate is 
likely to increase the number of firms interested in acquiring the distressed firm (due to the lower cost of 
financing such an acquisition deal) so that both the expected offer price and the probability of offer 
increase, which would increase the distressed firm’s equity value. 
4. Data 
   We consider ordinary common shares that were included into the CRSP Index for at least 126 days 
during a given subperiod, when the MPS beta is estimated. The firm-level financial data comes from 
Compustat; data on pricing factors is provided by Kenneth French’s website.2 The sample covers the 
period 2001-2015, which is divided into five three-year subperiods: (i) 2001-2003, (ii) 2004-2006, (iii) 
2007-2009, (iv) 2010-2012, and (v) 2013-2015, where the third subperiod (iii) 2007-2009 corresponds to 
the recent financial crisis (when the crisis dummy is set to one). For a given three-year subsample, we 
estimate the firm-level stock-return sensitivities to monetary policy shocks (i.e., MPS betas), and 
calculate the firm-level average values of characteristics, which will be used as control variables in the 
second-stage panel regression of MPS betas. We winsorize (at the bottom and top five percentiles) the 
three control variables: interest coverage ratio, leverage, and market-to-book ratio, where such ratio 
variables often have large outliers. 
  Our choice of a three-year estimation period mainly serves the two purposes as follows: First, we aim to 
allow the MPS beta to vary over time, especially around the recent crisis period. As such, the estimation 
                                                          
2
 See his website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
6 
 
period shorter than five years is desirable, whereas monthly returns over a five-year sample period are 
often analyzed in the asset pricing literature. Second, the number of daily return observations should be 
large so that MPS beta is estimated precisely. If the estimation period is short (e.g., shorter than one year), 
then the MPS beta may vary too much due to temporary market upheavals.
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5. Results 
   Table 1 presents summary statistics of the estimated firm-level MPS betas and characteristics. We can 
see that on average during the 2001-2015 period, MPS betas that are statistically significant (at the five 
percent level) have the mean of about -0.40 and the standard deviation of about 5.73. This implies that in 
response to an unexpected cutback on the short-term interest rate, stock prices increase on average, but 
their magnitude differs greatly across firms. This motivates us to investigate determinants of 
heterogeneity in the firm-level MPS betas. 
 Table 1 
Firm-Level Exposures to Monetary Policy Shocks (MPS Betas) 
 
  
Subsample period 2001-2003 2004 -2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015 All 
Obs: Total 6,519 5,967 5,247 5,116 5,118 27,967 
Obs: Significant at 5% 929 1,128 1,136 747 1,580 5,520 
     (Proportion to total) (14.25%) (18.90%) (21.65%) (14.60%) (30.87%) (19.74%) 
 Statistics of MPS Beta being Significant at the 5% Level 
       Mean -0.616 0.276 -0.281 -0.682 -0.689 -0.395 
       StdDev 2.002 3.786 1.591 13.945 2.832 5.731 
       Minimum -11.564 -24.086 -9.767 -377.675 -89.797 -377.675 
       Maximum 33.642 85.959 19.593 20.542 19.833 85.959 
Note: this table presents summary statistics of estimates of MPS betas that are statistically significant at the five 
percent level. MPS beta is estimated during each of five three-year subperiods. 
    
Table 2 provides results for the panel regression of firm-level MPS betas that are significant at the five 
percent level. We expect that low interest rates reduce firms’ financial burdens and hence increase their 
market values (Rigobon and Sack, 2004), especially for the distressed firms that have difficulty in paying 
interest expenses. Thus, the MPS beta of a distressed (either financially or operationally) firm is expected 
to be negative to magnitude greater than that of a non-distressed firm is. As shown by Table 2, a surprise 
                                                          
3
 For robustness check, we examine the case of yearly MPS betas estimated over fifteen one-year subperiods and 
find that results in this case (available upon request) do not make a real difference to the main results. 
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reduction in the Federal funds rate disproportionately increases the market value of a firm that is young, 
highly levered, and with a low market-to-book ratio (i.e., financially constrained firms), consistent with 
findings in Maio (2014). Note that differently from results in Maio (2014), size is not a significant factor 
in our results. This might be due to the fact that many firm characteristics (e.g., size, age, leverage and 
market-to-book ratio) are correlated with each other and that these characteristics are controlled for in our 
study and not in Maio (2014). 
  Importantly, we can also see that a surprise reduction in the Federal funds rate disproportionately 
increases the distressed company’s stock return: the coefficient on the distress dummy is significantly 
negative, and the coefficient on the interest coverage ratio, an inverse measure of distress, is significantly 
positive. These findings suggest that a surprise liquidity provision disproportionately increases the market 
value of a distressed company that is likely to need costly external financing. 
Table 2 
Determinants of MPS Beta: Panel Regression, 2001-2015 
   
Regression (1) (2) (3)  
         
Distress -0.320***    
  (0.066)    
InterestCoverage  0.0032***   
   (0.0007)   
Age 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.021***  
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)  
Leverage -0.472*** -0.339** -0.481***  
  (0.123) (0.151) (0.123)  
Size -0.020 -0.001 0.026  
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.018)  
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.087*** 0.101*** 0.092***  
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.015)  
Tangibility of Assets -0.346** -0.293* -0.317**  
  (0.139) (0.152) (0.140)  
Crisis -0.543* -0.501 -0.541*  
  (0.296) (0.319) (0.298)  
Constant -0.068 -0.407** -0.486***  
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  (0.178) (0.178) (0.157)  
Industry-specific fixed effects Yes  Yes   Yes  
Industry*Crisis fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  
Financial industry*Fundamentals Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 2,353 1,800 2,353  
Number of firms 1,814 1,410 1,814  
R-squared (within) 0.138 0.123 0.129  
Note: this table presents results for the panel regression of MPS betas. We control for Fama-French 12 industry 
dummies and interaction terms between the finance industry dummy and the three firm-level fundamentals: size, 
leverage, and market-to-book ratio of equity. Crisis-period fixed effects are controlled for by the crisis dummy for 
2007-2009 period and interaction terms between the crisis dummy and industry dummies. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.   
* indicates significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using data on the publicly traded U.S. firms over the 2001-2015 period, we find that for an unexpected 
reduction in the Federal funds rate, a distressed firm’s stock return disproportionately increases, holding 
constant other firm-level characteristics (e.g., size, leverage ratio, etc.). This finding suggests that an 
expansionary monetary policy shock can substantially reduce the costs associated with external financing 
and hence increase the firm value, especially for a distressed firm in need of costly external financing. 
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